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Abstract This article evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust
enforcement against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash
equilibrium model of research and development (R&D) competition to create new
products. In the two-firm model, whether one firm regards the other’s R&D
investment as a strategic complement or substitute turns on an increasing differ-
ences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D
investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or fails. Antitrust prohibi-
tions on pre-innovation product market exclusion, post-innovation product market
exclusion, and exclusion from R&D competition, are found to be effective in dif-
ferent strategic settings.
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1 Introduction
The antitrust concern with monopolization is not limited to prices; it also includes a
dominant firm’s suppression of new technologies, products, and business models.
Two well-known monopolization cases provide illustrations. At the start of the
twenty-first century, Microsoft, which was the monopolist of operating systems for
Intel-compatible personal computers, was found to have prevented nascent
operating system competition by excluding Netscape’s browser and Sun’s Java
programming language. A half century before, the Lorain Journal newspaper
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protected its monopoly on advertising by local businesses by excluding a radio
station entrant.1
This article evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement
against exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm through a Nash equilibrium model
of research and development (R&D) competition between a dominant firm and a
rival to create new products.2 The article is concerned solely with incentives to
innovate; it abstracts from the potential benefits of antitrust enforcement in lowering
(quality-adjusted) prices and increasing output in static markets. In the model, R&D
investment increases the prospects of innovation success but does not influence
post-investment price competition in the event that both firms succeed.3 These
simplifications make transparent the role of strategic interactions that involve R&D
investment.
In particular, the model demonstrates that enforcement actions that challenge pre-
innovation exclusion and enforcement actions that challenge post-innovation
exclusion will tend to be effective in different strategic settings.4 An antitrust
prohibition on dominant firm exclusion of its rival from post-innovation (pre-
innovation) product market competition will tend to increase the overall likelihood
of industry innovation if the dominant firm’s best response function slopes upward
(downward) and is sufficiently steep, or if its rival’s best response function slopes
downward (upward) and is sufficiently steep. In addition, an antitrust prohibition on
dominant firm exclusion of its rival from R&D competition increases the overall
likelihood of industry innovation if the dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D
investment as a strategic complement (its best response function slopes upward).
The model also shows that whether one firm regards the other firm’s R&D
investment as a strategic complement or strategic substitute turns on an increasing
differences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D
investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D effort
fails.5 Baker (2016) applies these results to identify observable factors that would
suggest whether dominant firms are likely to regard rival R&D as a strategic
1 Baker (2013) discusses these cases and the antitrust treatment of exclusionary conduct generally.
2 For recent surveys of the extensive economic literature relating competition and innovation, see
Gomellini (2013), Shapiro (2012), Schmutzler (2010), Baker (2007), and Gilbert (2006).
3 Aoki and Spiegel (2010) specify a model with the same mathematical structure to study the innovation
consequences of pre-grant patent publication.
4 Pre-innovation product market exclusion by a dominant firm may involve conduct that raises its rival’s
costs (input foreclosure) or inhibits its rival’s access to the market (customer foreclosure). A dominant
firm can also impede post-innovation product market competition by its rival in the event that both firms
innovate, as through technological investments in product incompatibility; loyalty discounts; tying;
locking-in customers through the sale of complementary products; investments that raise buyer switching
or search costs; or the creation of impediments to a rival’s challenges to a firm’s misuse of intellectual
property.
5 Other models of R&D competition also identify conditions under which a dominant firm treats rival
R&D investment as a strategic complement. For example, in a two-stage game with R&D investment in
cost reduction followed by Cournot competition, R&D efforts are strategic complements if the degree of
spillovers is sufficiently large (Vives (2008), p. 455, n. 40). R&D efforts are also strategic complements in
patent race models where the game is log-supermodular (Vives, 2005), p. 454). On the other hand,
Schmutzler (2010, p. 386; 2013, pp. 482, 483) suggests that when innovation is cost-reducing, R&D
investments are likely strategic substitutes for both firms in a duopoly, absent spillovers.
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complement or strategic substitute and to evaluate whether antitrust enforcers and
courts should question a dominant firm’s claim that alleged exclusionary conduct
enhances its incentive to innovate by increasing its return to R&D investment.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
In the model, two firms that sell differentiated products—a dominant firm and its
rival—compete to develop new or upgraded (next-generation) products by investing
in R&D. Strategic interaction is limited to R&D. R&D investments need not
succeed, but greater R&D investments make innovation success more likely. The
dominant firm may employ exclusionary practices that limit pre-innovation
competition or create impediments to post-innovation competition, but the rival
may not do so.6
The model implicitly presumes that the firms make decisions during two periods,
but their interaction reduces to a one-stage game. In the first period, both firms
invest in R&D that is aimed at developing a new or next-generation product. Each
firm’s investment affects its likelihood of successful innovation, which in turn
affects its profits. There are no spillovers from one firm’s R&D to its rival.
In the second period, uncertainty about each firm’s innovation success is resolved
and the firms receive payoffs. Payoffs do not vary directly with the level of
investment but do vary with whether innovation occurs (which is affected by
investment). Under this simplifying assumption, discussed more in Sect. 3.1, each
firm has only one possible way to innovate.
The dominant firm is designated firm 1; its rival is designated firm 2. Each firm
chooses R&D investment level Ii, for i = 1, 2. Its costs of R&D investment are
Ci = C(Ii), with Ci
i[ 0 and Cii
i [ 0. (The subscript i indicates differentiation with
respect to Ii.) Any costs of impeding competition through exclusionary conduct are
included in C1 and do not vary with I1.
Each firm’s probability of successfully innovating depends solely on the level of
its R&D investment: qi = qi(Ii). By assumption 0\ qi\ 1, qi
i[ 0, and qii
i \ 0, for
i = 1, 2. One concern of the Schumpeterian growth literature—the possibility that a
firm’s likelihood of successful innovation depends on the extent to which its current
technology lags that of its rival—could lie behind differences between the functions
q1(I1) and q2(I2), but those relationships are not modeled.
The second period is characterized by four possible states of the world: Both
firms may succeed in innovating; neither may succeed in doing so; only the
dominant firm may succeed; or only the rival may succeed. The payoffs to the firms
may be interpreted as the discounted present value of a future profit stream, and the
terms profit and payoff are used interchangeably.
6 In the model, the dominant firm and its rival also differ in two other ways: Exclusionary impediments to
product market competition increase dominant firm profits but reduce rival profits; and the dominant firm
receives a higher payoff than its rival when neither firm’s R&D investment succeeds.
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The payoffs in each state of the world and the ex ante probabilities of achieving
each are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Pijk represents payoffs to firm i in state of
the world (j, k), where j indicates whether the dominant firm succeeded (s) or failed
(f) in its innovation efforts and k similarly indicates whether the rival succeeded or
failed. All payoffs are non-negative.
Payoffs when both firms innovate (the (s, s) state of the world) depend on
exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition d. This parameter
increases as exclusionary impediments are removed. A lessening of exclusionary
impediments to post-innovation competition reduces dominant firm profits
(Pd
1ss(d)\ 0, for all d) and increases rival profits (Pd
2ss(d)[ 0, for all d). These
assumptions rule out strategies in which the dominant firm discourages rival
investment in R&D by committing to aggressive post-innovation competition.7
When neither firm innovates [the (f, f) state of the world], the firms compete in
price with existing products. Payoffs depend on exclusionary impediments to pre-
innovation product market competition h, which increases as impediments are
removed. By assumption, a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-
innovation competition lessens dominant firm profits (Ph
1ff(h)\ 0, for all h),
increases rival profits (Ph
2ff(h)[ 0, for all h), and lowers aggregate industry profits
(Ph
1ff(h) ? Ph
2ff(h)\ 0, for all h). In addition, pre-innovation profits are greater for
the dominant firm (P1ff(h)[P2ff(h), for all h). These assumptions build in an
Arrow replacement effect, by which the dominant firm has a greater opportunity
cost of innovation than the rival because innovation cannibalizes the dominant
firm’s greater pre-innovation profits.
Each firm is assumed to profit (individually) from innovation. Hence,
P1ss(d)[P1fs and P2ss(d)[P2sf for all d; P1sf[P1ff(h) and P2fs[P2ff(h)
for all h; P1sf[P1fs and P2fs[P2sf; and P1ss(d)[P1ff(h) and P2ss(d)[P2ff(h)
for all d and h.
The assumption that innovation is profitable for each firm individually implies
that aggregate profits are greater when both firms innovate than when neither
succeeds in doing so (P1ss(d) ? P2ss(d)[P2ff(h) ? P1ff(h) for all d and h). When
both firms succeed, moreover, competition is assumed to reduce aggregate profits
relative to the outcome in which only one firm succeeds in innovating, so
(P1sf ? P2sf)[ (P1ss(d) ? P2ss(d))[ 0, and (P1fs ? P2fs)[ (P1ss(d) ? P2ss
(d))[ 0, for all d.8 Aggregate industry profits are also assumed to be greater if
either firm successfully innovates than if neither does so, so (P1sf ? P2sf)[
(P1ff(h) ? P2ff(h))[ 0 and (P1fs ? P2fs)[P1ff(h) ? P2ff(h)[ 0, for all h.
7 When a dominant firm can employ exclusionary strategies, the removal of exclusionary impediments
enhances product market competition by improving the ability of rivals to contest the market, which
increases the rival’s rewards. By contrast, the Schumpeterian growth literature models increased product
market competition as arising from greater imitation, which reduces the rival’s rewards. (Shapiro, 2012,
pp. 372–374). The Schumpeterian literature also addresses two issues not explicitly treated here: the
influence of the discrepancy between the technology of a laggard and the leader on each firm’s incentives
to invest in R&D (Aghion et al. (2014); Athey and Schmutzler (2011)), and the potential erosion of the
distinction between policies that foster pre-innovation competition and policies that foster post-innovation
competition when firms engage in successive rounds of innovation (Segal and Whinston 2007).
8 This assumption restricts the extent to which post-innovation product differentiation expands the
overall market.
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The assumptions with regard to the effects of d and h on payoffs collectively
define a competition policy intervention against exclusionary conduct broadly: any
public policy that reduces dominant firm payoffs and increases rival payoffs in the
pertinent state of the world (pre- or post-innovation) in which both compete with
same-generation products.9 When exclusionary conduct would affect both pre-
innovation and post-innovation competition, the same policy may be regarded as
simultaneously affecting d and h. The model’s simple temporal structure avoids
analytical complications that are associated with sequential innovation, in which the
future product market competition that follows one round of product improvements
would also represent the pre-innovation product market competition that precedes
the next round.
The payoffs allow each firm’s R&D investment decision to reflect a mixture of
two motives. One is the incentive to escape competition. Investment in R&D frees
each firm from competition with a finite probability: If a firm succeeds in
innovating, it will avoid the state of the world in which neither firm succeeds (in
which the firms compete on price using existing products), and it has a chance of
avoiding the state of the world in which both firms succeed (in which the firms
compete on price with new products).
In addition, firm investment decisions reflect an incentive to innovate in order to
capture profits that arise from the increase in demand that is associated with
bringing a new or next-generation product to market. The expected payoff for
successful innovation is a probability-weighted sum of the profit in the event that the
rival firm does not also succeed and the smaller profit in the event that both firms
succeed.
Table 1 Payoffs in each state of the world
(Firm 1, Firm 2) Firm 2 succeeds Firm 2 does not succeed
Firm 1 succeeds P1ss(d), P2ss(d) P1sf, P2sf
Firm 1 does not succeed P1fs, P2fs P1ff(h), P2ff(h)
Table 2 Probability that each state of the world arises
Firm 2 succeeds Firm 2 does not succeed
Firm 1 succeeds q1q2 q1(1 - q2)
Firm 1 does not succeed (1 - q1)q2 (1 - q1)(1 - q2)
9 By assumption, exclusionary conduct does not affect either firm’s profits in states of the world in which
one firm innovates while the other does not.
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2.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
During the first period, the two firms simultaneously choose investment levels to
maximize V1 and V2, the expected value of the dominant firm and rival respectively,
where
V1 ¼ q1 I1  1 q2 I2  P1sf þ q1 I1 q2 I2 P1ss dð Þ
þ 1 q1 I1   1 q2 I2  P1ff hð Þ þ 1 q1 Ið Þ q2 I2 P1fsC1 I1 ;
and
V2 ¼ q2 I2  1 q1 I1  P2fs þ q2 I2 q1 I1 P2ss dð Þ
þ 1 q2 I2   1 q1 I1  P2ff hð Þ þ 1 q2 I2  q1 I1 P2sfC2 I2 :
The equilibrium values of I1 and I2 are determined by the simultaneous solution of
the two first order conditions
V11 ¼ 0 ¼ q11 1 q2
 




V22 ¼ 0 ¼ q22 1 q1
 
P2fs þ q22q1P2ssq22 1 q1
 
P2ffq22q1P2sfC22: ð2Þ
Second order conditions for a maximum (V11
1 \ 0 and V22
2 \ 0) are assumed to be
satisfied. Equilibrium investments are conditional on the extent of the exclusionary
impediments that are indexed by h and d; so these investments can be written Ii(h,
d). The analysis in the remainder of Sect. 2 will consider these impediments one at a
time, so it will be convenient to write Ii(z), where z represents h or d, as appropriate.
(A third policy instrument—greater innovation competition from challenging
practices that raise rival R&D costs – is addressed below in Sect. 3.2.)
The policymaker considers a competition policy intervention that alters z based
on whether the intervention increases the probability p that at least one firm
succeeds, where p(z) = q1 ? q2 - q1q2.10 The policymaker does not care which
firm innovates. The policymaker does not seek to identify the optimal policy
intervention; instead it evaluates the consequences of a small change in z for the
likelihood of industry innovation.
By differentiating the definition of p(z), it is evident that a competition policy
intervention that raises z by a small amount will increase p if and only if
dp/dz = q1
1(1 - q2) dI1/dz ? q2
2(1 - q1) dI2/dz[ 0. This equation formalizes the
intuitive idea that a policy intervention may benefit innovation if it leads to a
substantial increase in one firm’s incentives to invest and its resulting likelihood of
success, without markedly reducing the other firm’s incentives to invest.
10 In practice, the antitrust enforcement agencies would be expected to prefer that multiple firms succeed
when industry features like intellectual property rights or network effects do not make innovation
competition winner-take-all. It is reasonable to assume that agency preferences are lexicographic,
however, in recognition of the many studies that find that the social return to innovation substantially
exceeds the private return and that identify substantial social gains to new product introductions in
individual industries.
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Each firm is assumed to be able to make an informed judgment about the way
that its rival’s investment level depends on the policy variables h and d, and to
account for rival responses in choosing investment levels and responding to
competition policy interventions. The latter responses will depend on the partial
derivatives of the first-order conditions, which are set forth in Table 3. The table
indicates the signs of those derivatives, to the extent that they are determined by
prior assumptions.
In the table, the expressions for the cross-partial derivatives V12
1 and V21
2 are
simplified by defining two new variables—D and W—that are related to the relative




To interpret D, note that (P1ss - P1fs) is the incremental benefit of innovation
success to firm 1, conditional on firm 2’s succeeding, while (P1sf - P1ff) is the
incremental benefit of innovation success to firm 1, conditional on firm 2’s not
succeeding. Hence D is positive if and only if firm 1 gains more from innovation
success conditional on firm 2’s succeeding than it gains conditional on firm 2’s not
succeeding. Similarly, W is positive if and only if firm 2 gains more from its
innovation success in the event that firm 1 also succeeds than it gains in the event
that firm 1 does not succeed.
The first-order conditions (1) and (2) imply best response functions (reaction
functions) for the two firms: I1 = q1(I
2) for the dominant firm; and I2 = q2(I
1) for
its rival. These functions are assumed invertible, which allows the dominant firm’s
reaction function to be written I2 = q1
-1(I1). Reaction function slopes are defined by
differentiating functions of the form I2(I1) with respect to I1:




R2 ¼ dq2=dI1 ¼ V221=V222 ¼  q11q22W
 
=V222: ð4Þ
The signs of the reaction function slopes are the same as the signs of D and W,
respectively. If D and W are both positive, each best response function is upward
sloping (strategic complements); if D and W are both negative, each best response
function is downward sloping (strategic substitutes). If D and W take on opposite
signs, the best response functions differ in the sign of their slopes.
Equation (3) implies that the dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D investment
as a strategic substitute (firm 1’s reaction function slopes downward), if and only if
firm 1’s incremental gains from innovating are greater when firm 2 does not
succeed. Intuitively, a less aggressive R&D investment strategy by firm 2—a
reduction in the second firm’s R&D investment—lessens that firm’s likelihood of
innovation success. If the incremental benefit of R&D investment by firm 1
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increases as a result—if D is negative—then the first firm will have an incentive to
invest more in R&D. Accordingly, when D is negative, firm 1 regards its rival’s
investment as a strategic substitute. Moreover, D is positive if and only if firm 1
regards its rival’s investment as a strategic complement.
Equation (4) similarly implies that W is negative if and only if firm 2 regards the
dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic substitute, and W is positive if and
only if firm 2 regards the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic
complement. Increasing differences conditions appear because the R&D game is
supermodular when V11
1 C 0 and V21
2 C 0.
Reaction functions can slope in different directions, as D andW need not have the
same sign. For example, two market features—a high market share for the dominant
firm in the event that both firms innovate, and a high likelihood that its rival would
take a substantial fraction of customers away from the dominant firm in the event
that only the rival innovates—tend to increase D while reducing W, possibly leading
the dominant firm to regard its rival’s R&D investment as a strategic complement
(D[ 0), while the rival simultaneously views dominant firm investment as a
strategic substitute (W\ 0).11
2.3 Stability
The conditions for stability of the model’s Nash equilibria vary depending on
whether the reaction functions slope in the same or opposite directions. Local
stability of the Nash equilibrium of this two-player game with one-dimensional




1 (1 - q2)P1sf ? q11
1 q2P1ss - q11
1 (1 - q2)P1ff - q11




22(1 - q1) P2fs ? q2
22q1P2ss - q2




























2 -(1 - q1)q2
2Ph
2ff \0
11 Baker (2016) provides examples of R&D competition that involved IBM, Microsoft, and Xerox where
dominant firm and rival reaction functions may have had different slopes, and Tombak (2006) suggests
the same for Boeing and Airbus’s investment decisions. In addition, suppose that an industry is
characterized by what Athey and Schmutzler (2011) term ‘‘weak increasing dominance’’ (a firm with low
marginal cost invests more than its rival), and the dominant firm is a technological leader. If the
technological leader’s conduct is dominated by a desire to extend its lead (because higher R&D increases
the marginal benefit of investment net of cost) while the laggard’s conduct is dominated by a desire not to
take on the leader (because it obtains little marginal benefit from R&D investment and has a high
marginal cost), then the dominant firm’s reaction function would likely be upward sloping and its rival’s
reaction function would likely be downward sloping.
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strategy spaces requires that |R2|/|R1|\ 1, or equivalently, that |R1|[ |R2|. (See
Vives, 1999, p. 51.) If R1 and R2 have the same sign, the Nash equilibrium is stable




2 [ 0, where D is the determinant of the
matrix of own- and cross-partial derivatives of the first-order condition. If R1 and R2






Each stability condition requires that firm 1 have the steeper reaction function.
D[ 0 assures stability when reaction functions slope in the same direction. If
reaction functions slope in opposite directions, D[ 0 necessarily holds, but D[ 0
is no longer sufficient for stability. To guarantee stability in that case, it is sufficient
to assume that when reaction functions have different signs, decreasing returns to
scale in dominant firm investments in R&D are sufficiently strong (C11
1 is
sufficiently large) as to make V11






2.4 Consequences of Policy Interventions for R&D Investment
and the Likelihood of Innovation
The policy interventions are analyzed using a comparative statics approach, which
presumes that those interventions are small. This assumption excludes interventions
that would alter payoffs so substantially as to change the sign of D or W, and thus
change the sign of a reaction function. Propositions 1 and 2 show how increases in
the policy variable z shift the two firms’ reaction functions in a space in which I1 is
on the horizontal axis. The policy variable will be interpreted in turn as a reduction
in impediments to pre-innovation competition (higher h) and a reduction in
impediments to post-innovation competition (higher d). Proposition 3 provides a
general comparative statics result for shifts in z. Proofs of all propositions in this
article are provided in an ‘‘Appendix’’.
Proposition 1 (Direction of the Shift of the Dominant Firm’s Reaction
Function) An increase in z shifts q1 [the reaction function of I
1 with respect to
I2] in the direction of higher I1 if and only if -V1z
1 /V11
1 [ 0.
Corollary For q1, dI
1/dz[ 0 if and only if V1z
1 [ 0.
Proposition 2 (Direction of the Shift of the Rival’s Reaction Function) An
increase in z shifts q2 [the reaction function of I
2 with respect to I1] in the direction
of higher I2 if and only if -V2z
2 /V22
2 [ 0.
Corollary For q2, dI
2/dz[ 0 if and only if V2z
2 [ 0.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that when the policy intervention reduces
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition (greater h), the dominant
firm’s reaction function shifts in the direction of greater I1 (as V1h
1 [ 0), reflecting
that firm’s increased incentive to escape pre-innovation competition. The rival’s
12 If the stability condition for reaction functions that slope in opposite directions binds, however, it
could limit the absolute values of D and W that would satisfy the condition for a policy intervention to
increase the probability of innovation.
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reaction function shifts in the direction of lower I2 (as V2h
2 \ 0), reflecting its
reduced incentive to escape pre-innovation competition.
If the policy intervention instead involves a reduction in exclusionary imped-
iments to post-innovation competition (greater d), each reaction function shifts in a
direction that is opposite to the way that it shifts in response to a reduction in
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition. With V1d
1 \ 0, the
dominant firm’s reaction function shifts in the direction of lower I1, which reflects
that firm’s lessened incentive to invest in R&D as a consequence of the lower payoff
that it will receive in the event that both firms innovate. With V2d
2 [ 0, the rival’s
reaction function shifts in the direction of greater I2, which reflects its increased
incentive to invest in R&D as a consequence of the greater payoff that it will receive
in the event both firms innovate.
The possibility that each reaction function may slope upward or downward
generates four cases. (The stability condition requires that firm 1 have the steeper
reaction function (in absolute value) in each case.) Figure 1 depicts the
consequences for innovation of a reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-
innovation competition for the case in which the dominant firm’s reaction function
is upward sloping and its rival’s reaction function slopes downward. In the figure,
the original reaction functions are depicted as thick solid lines; the reactions after
the policy intervention are depicted as thin lines; and the equilibrium outcome shifts
upward (toward higher I2).
As is evident from the figure, a reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-
innovation competition necessarily increases rival R&D investment, and its
consequences for dominant firm R&D investment are indeterminate. A reduction
in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition operates in reverse, as
though reaction functions shifted from the thin lines to the thick ones in the figure.
Accordingly, that policy intervention leads to a reduction in rival R&D investment
and an indeterminate change in dominant firm investment when the dominant firm’s
reaction function is upward sloping and the rival’s reaction function slopes
downward.
Table 4 summarizes what Fig. 1 and similar figures for the other three cases
show about the consequences of a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-
innovation competition for each firm’s equilibrium investment. In the case that is
evaluated in the final column, both best response functions slope upward. Then each
firm’s investment level may either increase or decrease but they cannot simulta-
neously increase unless the policy intervention has relatively little influence on the
rival’s reaction function (in which case the new equilibrium would be approxi-
mately determined by shifting the dominant firm’s reaction function along the
rival’s upward sloping reaction function).
The table indicates that a downward sloping reaction function for the dominant
firm guarantees that the dominant firm will increase its investment in R&D when
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition are reduced. It also shows
that a downward sloping reaction function for the rival guarantees that the same
policy intervention will lead the rival to reduce its investment in R&D.
Table 5 provides a similar summary of the consequences of a reduction in
exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition. That policy intervention
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shifts each reaction function in the opposite direction from a reduction in
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition, so it operates like a shift
of the equilibrium outcome in the reverse direction from the way that the outcome
moved in the cases that are described in Table 4 (as is evident, in the first column,
for the case illustrated in Fig. 1). Accordingly, the sign of each determinate entry in
Table 5 switches relative to the sign of the corresponding entry in Table 4.
The table indicates that a downward sloping reaction function for the rival
guarantees that the rival will increase its investment in R&D when exclusionary
impediments to post-innovation competition are reduced. It also shows that a
downward sloping reaction function for the dominant firm guarantees that the same





Dominant  Firm 
R&D Investment
Rival  reacon funcons 
( 2) (strategic substutes)
Dominant ﬁrm 






A policy intervenon that reduces exclusionary 
impediments to post-innovaon compeon 
shis reacon funcons from the thick lines to 
the corresponding thin lines 
Fig. 1 Comparative statics of reducing exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition when
q1 is upward sloping and q2 is downward sloping
Table 4 Comparative statics of a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition
R1[ 0 & R2\ 0 R1\ 0 & R2\ 0 R1\ 0 & R2[ 0 R1[ 0 & R2[ 0
I1 Indeterminate Increases Increases Indeterminate
I2 Decreases Decreases Indeterminate Indeterminate
R1 is the slope of the dominant firm’s reaction function (q1), and R
2 is the slope of the rival’s reaction
function (q2)
Table 5 Comparative statics of a reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition
R1[ 0 & R2\ 0 R1\ 0 & R2\ 0 R1\ 0 & R2[ 0 R1[ 0 & R2[ 0
I1 Indeterminate Decreases Decreases Indeterminate
I2 Increases Increases Indeterminate Indeterminate
R1 is the slope of the dominant firm’s reaction function (q1), and R
2 is the slope of the rival’s reaction
function (q2)
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Tables 4 and 5 suggest a relationship between the direction that reaction
functions slope and the innovation consequences of the two competition policy
interventions. To ensure conceptual clarity, the discussion will be couched in terms
of the policy-maker’s selecting the better intervention, ignoring the possibility that
the available policy instruments could allow or would require the policy-maker to
combine its interventions.
Table 4 indicates that a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation
competition stimulates dominant firm investment when the dominant firm’s reaction
function is downward sloping, and that rival investment cannot increase unless the
rival’s reaction function is upward sloping. Table 5 indicates that a reduction in
exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition stimulates rival invest-
ment when the rival’s reaction function is downward sloping. It also shows that the
dominant firm’s R&D investment cannot increase unless the dominant firm’s
reaction function is upward sloping.
The consequences of the two policy interventions for R&D investment are
analyzed analytically in Propositions 3 and 4. Proposition 3 derives the
consequences of a small competition policy intervention for investment by the
two firms through a comparative statics analysis.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics) The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are
increasing with marginal increases in z if the following conditions hold:
















¼ V22zV111 þ V221V11z
 
D [ 0:
Each policy intervention could simultaneously increase both firms’ R&D
investment, in which case the overall probability of innovation success necessarily
rises. But in other cases, each intervention may increase one firm’s R&D
investment, which boosts its probability of innovation success, while reducing the
other firm’s R&D investment and thereby lessening its probability of innovation
success. Proposition 4 derives the conditions under which a small policy
intervention will increase the overall probability of innovation success. These
propositions confirm what is evident from Tables 4 and 5: Restrictions on the signs
of the slopes of the reaction functions are not sufficient to guarantee that policy
interventions will benefit innovation; the steepness of those slopes and the extent to
which the intervention shifts reaction functions also matter.
Proposition 4 (Conditions for Policy Interventions to Increase the Probability of
Innovation) A policy intervention that raises z by a small amount will increase p
[the probability that at least one firm succeeds] if and only if
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dp=dz ¼ q11 1 q2
  V11zV222 þ V112V22z
 
=D
þ q22 1 q1
  V22zV111 þ V221V11z
 
=D [ 0:
Corollary 1 A reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation compe-
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Corollary 2 A reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-innovation compe-
tition (greater d) will increase p if and only if
q1 q11
 2
1 q2  q22
 2
P1ssd D þ q11q22
 2
1 q1 q2P1ssd W [
q11
 2







From Corollary 1, two sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that lessens
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition to raise the likelihood of
innovation can be identified: The dominant firm’s reaction function has a
sufficiently downward slope (D is sufficiently negative); or the rival’s reaction
function has a sufficiently upward slope (W is sufficiently positive). (These are not
necessary conditions because the left-hand side of the inequality can take on either
sign.) The condition in the corollary will also be satisfied in the limit (regardless of
the signs of D and W) as q1
1 grows small: as the dominant firm’s likelihood of
innovation success becomes insensitive to its level of investment.13
Corollary 2 similarly implies two sufficient conditions for a policy intervention
that lessens exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition to raise the
likelihood of innovation: The dominant firm’s reaction function has a sufficiently
upward slope (D is sufficiently positive); or the rival’s reaction function has a
sufficiently downward slope (W is sufficiently negative). (These are not necessary
conditions because the right-hand side of the inequality can take either sign.)
The sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that reduces exclusionary
impediments to pre-innovation competition to increase the likelihood of innovation
(from Corollary 1 to Proposition 4) suggest that a downward sloping best-response
function for the dominant firm and an upward sloping best-response function for its
rival favor the success of that intervention in increasing the aggregate likelihood of
13 It would also be satisfied if V22
2 is sufficiently large in absolute value and V11
1 is sufficiently small in
absolute value; but this possibility is inconsistent with the stability condition, which will fail as V11
1
approaches zero.
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innovation. To provide an intuition, a firm’s non-strategic response to the policy
intervention (its response if the other firm’s investment level is held constant) will
be separated from its strategic response.
A policy intervention that limits pre-innovation product market exclusion will, in
the first instance (before accounting for strategic responses), encourage the
dominant firm to invest more in R&D in order to escape competition and encourage
its rival to invest less by increasing its pre-innovation profits and reducing its
incentive to escape competition. The dominant firm will be encouraged to invest
even more in response to the investment decision of its rival, if the dominant firm
regards rival R&D as a strategic substitute. On the assumption that the dominant
firm does invest more,14 the rival’s non-strategic incentive to cut back on R&D will
be dampened or countered if it views the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a
strategic complement, and amplified if it views the dominant firm’s R&D
investment as a strategic substitute. If the dominant firm invests more, and its
rival’s R&D investment increases or does not decline much, the aggregate
probability of R&D success may increase. In this way, the dominant firm’s
downward sloping reaction function and its rival’s upward sloping reaction function
may work together to support an increase in the overall likelihood of innovation.
For analogous reasons, the sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that
reduces exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition to increase the
likelihood of innovation (from Corollary 2 to Proposition 4) suggest that an upward
sloping reaction function for the dominant firm and a downward sloping best
response function for the rival favor the success of that intervention. (Figure 1
depicts the case in which both occur.)
Intuitively, if we assume that the rival invests more,15 the dominant firm’s non-
strategic incentive to reduce R&D will be dampened or countered if it views its own
R&D investment as a strategic complement, and amplified if it views the rival’s
R&D investment as a strategic substitute.16 If the rival invests more, and the
dominant firm’s R&D investment increases or does not decline much, the aggregate
probability of R&D success may increase.
14 Aggregate incentives to innovate may increase even if the dominant firm invests less. This outcome
may arise if the rival regards the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strong strategic complement, so
long as the rival’s strategic response is so substantial as to lead the rival to invest more and so long as the
aggregate probability of innovation is more heavily influenced by greater rival investment than by
reduced dominant firm investment. The intuition that is offered in the text emphasizes one of the
sufficient conditions that are derived from Corollary 1 to Proposition 4: that the dominant firm’s reaction
function slopes downward. The intuition in this note emphasizes the other sufficient condition: that the
rival’s reaction function slopes upward.
15 Aggregate incentives to innovate may also increase even if the rival invests less. This outcome may
arise if the dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D investment as a strong strategic substitute, so long as
the rival’s strategic response is so substantial as to lead the dominant firm to invest more and so long as
the aggregate probability of innovation is more heavily influenced by greater dominant firm investment
than by reduced rival investment.
16 For this reason, the antitrust policy application in Baker (2016) turns on evaluating the sign of the
slope of the dominant firm’s reaction function.
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3 Extensions
3.1 Payoffs that Depend on R&D Investments
In the model that was discussed in Sect. 2, the payoffs to successful innovation do
not vary with the level of R&D investment. This assumption, which is tantamount to
supposing that each firm has only one possible way to innovate, is most plausible
when firms are pursuing major new products, substantial product upgrades, or
drastic cost reductions. In these settings, firm payoffs to R&D investment will likely
be determined primarily by whether the R&D effort succeeds.
The assumption that the payoffs to successful innovation do not vary with the
level of R&D investment is less attractive for non-drastic cost reductions. Then firm
payoffs will depend in part on the way that cost reductions affect the oligopoly
interaction in product markets, which is not incorporated in the model. The
assumption is also less attractive in some settings that involve demand-enhancing
(new product) innovation. These include the possibility that the level of investment
affects the magnitude of the quality improvement (in a vertical differentiation
model) or the proximity of new goods in product space (in a horizontal
differentiation model). In general, when payoffs to innovation success depend on
R&D investments, the slopes of reaction functions would continue to be influenced
by the relative magnitude of payoffs in various states of the world, as in the model
that is set forth here; but additional factors that are not incorporated in the model
would also be expected to matter.
R&D spillovers may also lead the payoffs to innovation success to vary with the
level of R&D investment. If one firm’s R&D success benefits the other firm by
increasing the probability that the rival would also succeed, without changing the
payoffs to innovation success, the slopes of reaction functions would not change and
the comparative statics results of Proposition 3 would continue to apply.17 More
generally, though, positive R&D investment spillovers would also be expected to
change the payoffs to innovation success, and, in consequence, alter the way that
firm R&D investments respond to reductions in exclusionary impediments to
product market competition in additional ways that are not captured by the model.
On the one hand, the spillovers that are generated by a policy intervention that
leads one firm to increase its R&D investment would be expected to lower the
marginal cost or increase the marginal benefit of R&D investment by its rival, which
would lead the rival to increase its own R&D expenditures. On the other hand, the
greater R&D investment by one firm would also increase the likelihood that its
rival’s R&D effort would succeed and reduce the likelihood that the rival would
succeed alone. This would be expected to discourage the rival from increasing its
R&D investment in response because it would reduce the rival’s ability to escape
competition by developing new products or lowering production costs, thereby
17 Even under this assumption, however, the conditions under which policy interventions increase the
probability of innovation (Proposition 4) would require modification to incorporate the interdependence
in probabilities of innovation success.
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lessening the rival’s expected payoffs to innovation success.18 If positive R&D
spillovers are important, it would be necessary to account for these possible
additional dynamics to determine how firms alter their R&D investments in
response to policy changes that reduce impediments to product market exclusion.
3.2 Raising Rival R&D Costs
Dominant firms may also exclude innovation rivals by raising their R&D costs, as
by raising the price of inputs such as intellectual property rights. This possibility
may be incorporated into the model by assuming that antitrust enforcers have a third
policy instrument (r) that has the effect of lowering the rival’s cost of R&D
investment I2. A higher r represents reduced exclusion, which is consistent with the
way that the other policy interventions are signed.
To incorporate this possibility, the rival’s R&D cost function is assumed to take
the form C2 = C2(r, I2), where Cr
2 \ 0, Cr2
2 \ 0, C2
2[ 0, and C22
2 \ 0. (Consistent
with previous notation, the subscript 2 identifies the partial derivative with respect
to I2 (which also happens to be the variable in the second position).) The assumption
that Cr2
2 \ 0 recognizes that a competition policy intervention that limits the ability
of the dominant firm to raise its rival’s R&D costs will lower the rival’s marginal
cost of R&D investment.
This modification to the model does not alter the expression for the expected
value of the dominant firm (V1), and the expected value of the rival (V2) differs only
in the form of the cost function:
V2 ¼ q2 I2  1 q1 I1  P2fs þ q2 I2 q1 I1 P2ss dð Þ
þ 1 q2 I2   1 q1 I1  P2ff hð Þ
þ 1 q2 I2  q1 I1 P2sfC2 r; I2 :
Because the policy intervention parameter r appears only in the rival’s cost func-
tion, the first-order conditions are written as before, though with the C2
2 term in
Eq. (2) defined differently: as a partial derivative of the cost function C(r, I2)).
Comparative statics require signing the partial derivatives V1
1 and V2
2 with respect to
r: V1r
1 = 0, and V2r
2 = -Cr2
2 [ 0.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics) The equilibrium level of I2 necessarily
increases with marginal increases in r; and the equilibrium level of I1 increases with
marginal increases in r if and only if D[ 0.
Corollary (Sufficient condition for a Policy Intervention that Reduces the Marginal
Cost of Rival R&D to Increase the Probability of Innovation) A policy
intervention that raises r by a small amount will necessarily increase p if D[ 0.
18 This discussion is concerned with the way that reductions in exclusionary impediments to product
market competition would alter R&D investments by the firms, not on the way that the presence of
spillovers would alter initial investment levels. Each firm’s equilibrium level of R&D investment before a
policy intervention would differ from the corresponding level in a model that does not allow for R&D
spillovers because of the increased likelihood that both firms would succeed and the reduced likelihood
that either firm would succeed alone.
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Proposition 5 and its corollary show that a competition policy intervention that
reduces the marginal cost of the rival’s R&D (greater r) will necessarily increase
rival investment, and will increase dominant firm investment if and only if the
dominant firm regards rival investment as a strategic complement (D[ 0). In the
latter case, the overall probability of innovation necessarily increases. If the
dominant firm instead regards rival investment as a strategic substitute, the rival will
invest more in R&D; but the dominant firm will invest less. Under such
circumstances, the effect on the overall probability of innovation success will
depend on the relative magnitudes of these effects and on the way that variation in
each firm’s R&D investment affects its probability of innovation success.
4 Conclusion
In the model of research and development competition that is set forth in this article,
the innovation consequences of competition policy interventions that challenge the
exclusionary conduct of dominant firms depend importantly on the direction of the
strategic response of dominant firms and their rivals to each other’s R&D
investments. Enforcement actions that challenge pre-innovation exclusion and
enforcement actions that challenge post-innovation exclusion will tend to be
effective in different strategic settings. In addition, a competition policy interven-
tion that prevents dominant firms from excluding innovation rivals by raising their
R&D costs will necessarily increase rival investment, and will increase dominant
firm investment if and only if the dominant firm regards rival investment as a
strategic complement. These results are relevant to the antitrust evaluation of a
dominant firm’s ‘‘appropriability’’ justification for exclusionary practices: its claim
that those practices will benefit innovation by increasing its own reward for
innovation success and, thus, encouraging it to invest more in R&D (Baker 2016).
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Appendix
Proposition 1 An increase in z shifts q1 in the direction of higher I




Proof Firm 1’s reaction function I1 = q1(I
2) is defined implicitly by first order
condition (1): V1
1 (I1, I2, z) = 0. If we assume that V1
1 (I1, I2, z) is continuous and
differentiable, then total differentiation of Eq. (1) yields V11
1 dI1 ? V12
1 dI2 ?
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V1z
1 dz = 0. An increase in z shifts q1 in the direction of higher I
1 if and only if
dI1/dz[ 0, for dI2 = 0. If dI2 = 0, then dI1/dz = –V1z
1 /V11
1 . Hence dI1/dz[ 0 if
and only if –V1z
1 /V11
1 . h
Proposition 2 An increase in z shifts q2 in the direction of higher I




Proof Firm 2’s reaction function I2 = q2(I
1) is defined implicitly by first order
condition (2): V2
2 (I2, I1, z) = 0. If we assume that V2
2(I2, I1, z) is continuous and
differentiable, then total differentiation of Eq. (2) yields V21
2 dI1 ? V22
2 dI2 ?
V2z
2 dz = 0. An increase in z shifts q2 in the direction of higher I
2 if and only if
dI2/dz[ 0, for dI1 = 0. If dI1 = 0, then dI2/dz = -V2z
2 /V22
2 . Hence, dI2/dz[ 0 if
and only if -V2z
2 /V22
2 [ 0. h
Proposition 3 The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with



























Proof The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with marginal increases in
z if dI1/dz[ 0 and dI2/dz[ 0, respectively. The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2
are defined by the simultaneous solution of the first-order conditions (1) and (2), on
the assumption that the second-order conditions hold. As indicated in the
proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, total differentiation of these conditions yields
V11
1 dI1 ? V12
1 dI2 ? V1z
1 dz = 0 and V21
2 dI ? V22
2 dI2 ? V2z
2 dz = 0. The simultane-















Proposition 4 A policy intervention that raises z by a small amount
will increase p if and only if dp/dz = q1











Proof By definition, p(z) = q1(I1) ? q2(I2) - q1(I1) q2(I2), with I1(z) and I2(z).
Differentiating with respect to z yields dp/dz = q1
1(1 - q2) dI1/dz ? q2
2 (1 - q1)









1 ]/D. Hence dp/dz = q1











Proposition 5 The equilibrium level of I2 necessarily increases with marginal
increases in r, and the equilibrium level of I1 increases with marginal increases in r
if and only if D[ 0.
Proof The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with marginal increases in
r if and only if dI1/dr[ 0 and dI2/dr[ 0, respectively. In this problem, the
objective functions of the two firms are written V1 = q1(I1)(1 - q2(I2))P1sf ?
q1(I1)q2(I2)P1ss(d) ? (1 - q1(I1))(1-q2(I2))P1ff(h) ? (1 - q1(I))q2(I2)P1fs - C1(I1), and
V2 = q2(I2)(1 - q1(I1))P2fs ? q2(I2) q1(I1)P2ss(d) ? (1 - q2(I2))(1 - q1(I1))P2ff(h) ?
(1 - q2(I2))q1(I1)P2sf - C2(r, I2). The first order conditions that are solved
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simultaneously for I1(r) and I2(r) require V1
1 = 0 = q1
1(1 - q2)P1sf ?
q1
1q2P1ss - q2
1(1 - q2)P1ff - q1
1q2P1fs - C1
1, and V2
2 = 0 = q2
2(1 - q1)P2fs ?
q2
2q1P2ss - q2
2(1 - q1)P2ff - q2
2q1P2sf - C2
2. Total differentiation of the first order
conditions implies V11
1 dI1 ? V12
1 dI2 ? V1r
1 dr = 0 and V21
2 dI1 ? V22
2 dI2 ?
V2r
2 dr = 0, which imply in turn that dI1/dr = [V12
1 V2r
2 ]/D and dI2/dr =
[-V2r
2 V11




2 ]. The expression
dI2/dr is necessarily positive because V2r
2 = -Cr2[ 0, V11
1 \ 0, and D[ 0. (If the
reaction functions have opposite signs, D is necessarily positive. If the reaction
functions have the same sign, D is positive by virtue of the assumption that the
equilibrium is stable.) In the expression for dI1/dr, Vr2
2 [ 0 and D[ 0, so dI1/dr has
the same sign as V12
1 , which has the sign of D. h
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